UGL REGIONAL LINX

Emergency Management Plan
CRN-PLN-RLS-459032646-202

LINKING COMMUNITIES. CONNECTING CUSTOMERS.

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Document Control

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Version	Issue Date	Revision Description
1.0	19.10.2021	First Version
2.0	29.3.2023	Reviewed and updated Updated Appendices 3,4,5. Added structure diagram in section 6 Added descriptions to 6.4 Protocols Added table to 6.5 Resources Added coordination tables and graphs Re-arranged content structure
3.0	09.08.2023	Rewritten for Sigview context, CY3 Plan
4.0	09.05.2024	Removal of Sigview references, inclusion of RMTC solution matters and emergency scenario details
5.0	23.05.2024	Amendments identified from Emergency Management Audit (multiple sections affected)

Definitions and Abbreviations

Term	Definition
ATSB	Australian Transport Safety Bureau
BCMP	Business Continuity Management Plan
CNI	CRN Network Instruction
CNRP	CRN Network Rules and Procedures
Combat Agency	Means the agency identified in EMPLAN as the agency primarily responsible for controlling the response to a particular emergency. Combat Agency
CRN	Country Regional Network
DRS	Disaster Recovery Site (Mayfield West)
EAP	Employee Assistance Program
EBR	Enterprise Barrier Register
ECT	Emergency/Executive Crisis Team
Emergency	An event that arises internally, or from external sources, which may significantly adversely affect the railway operations, or the facilities associated with such

	operations, and involves coordinated responses from multiple Emergency Services agencies.
Emergency Services agency	Means the NSW Police, NSW Fire Brigades, Rural Fire Service, Ambulance Service, and State Emergency Service, Volunteer Rescue Association or any other agency which manages or controls an accredited rescue unit.
EMP	Emergency Management Plan
EMT	Emergency Management Team
EPA	Environmental Protection Authority
ERR	Enterprise Risk Register
ERT	Emergency Response Team
GSN	Goal Structured Notation (component of a Safety Case)
Hazardous Material Incident	Means an actual or impending land-based spillage or other escape of hazardous material that causes or threatens to cause injury or death or damage to property.
IMP	Incident Management Procedure
Incident	Means a localised event, either accidental or deliberate, which may result in adverse outcomes to people, property or the environment, which requires a response from UGLRL or an agency/agencies.
Lead Agency	Means the agency that has overall leadership in each situation (a combat agency, a Functional Area, or another agency).
NCC	(Orange) Network Control Centre
NCO	Network Control Officer
Network Control	The resource responsible for the planning, programming, and control of rolling stock movements on the CRN.
NIR	Network Incident Report
ONRSR	Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator, the statutory regulatory body for the Rail Transport industry.
OSC	On-site Coordinator
OTSI	Office of Transport Safety Investigations (NSW)
PCBU	Person Conducting a Business Undertaking
Rail Corridor	The area bounded by and within the designated railway fence line, or where no fence line exists, within 15m from the nearest rail, covering both operational and non-operational rail lines.
REMC	Regional Emergency Management Council
Response	In relation to an incident or emergency includes the process of combating the incident or emergency consequences and of providing immediate relief for persons affected by an emergency.
RIC	Response Incident Commander
RIM	Rail Infrastructure Manager
RMTC	Remote Management Train Control project
RSNL (NSW and ACT)	The Rail Safety National Law to which UGLRL is bound to comply for all rail safety elements relating to its obligations as a Rail Transport Operator
RSNLNR 2012	The Rail Safety National Law Regulations 2012, to which UGLRL is bound to comply for all elements of its rail SMS as a Rail Transport Operator
RSO	Rolling Stock Operator
RTC	Rail Traffic Crew
RTO	Rail Transport Operator, a category of organisation that is eligible for rail safety accreditation in NSW as defined in Part 1, Section 4 of Rail Safety National Law 2012.
SAR	Safety Assurance Report
SEC	Safety and Environment Committee
SFAIRP	So Far as Is Reasonably Practicable, a measure of the level of safety management required to be demonstrated to comply with legislation

SIA	Safety Interface Agreement
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMS	Safety Management System
TCM	Train Control Manager
TMACS	Train Management and Control System (for Train Order Working only)
UGLRL	UGL Regional Linx

1 Introduction

As the accredited Rail Transport Operator (RTO) of the Country Regional Network (CRN), UGL Regional Linx (UGLRL) provides this annual Emergency Management Plan (EMP) to meet the requirements of Section 113 of *Rail Safety National Law (NSW)* (RSNL) and Part 4 Division 3 of *Rail Safety National Law National Regulations 2012* (RSNLNR).

This EMP is provided in lieu of an Emergency Management framework as the lead document against Element 25 of the rail Safety Management System (SMS). UGLRL has developed and implemented this EMP to outline the governance processes needed to effectively manage emergencies on the CRN. Coordination of an effective response to a significant event that requires timely and coordinated actions from the parent organisation, the client and emergency/combat agencies. The required actions are as provided in *CRN-PRC-RLS-4590 3646-206 Incident Management Procedure* (IMP) and recognises the fact that any incident that escalates into an emergency/crisis event will necessarily involve CIMIC and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) resources and that those resources are required to interact with internal UGLRL stakeholders during and after control of the event is gained.

The planned activities for Contract Year 3 (CY3) are incorporated into this EMP, which necessarily therefore includes, as a major component, the implementation of the remote working of the Train Management and Control System (TMACS) and Phoenix system (for rail vehicle detection areas) as installed at the Mayfield Network Management Centre (NMC) from the Orange Network Control Centre (NCC). This is the Remote Management Train Control (RMTC) project and is an initiative to eliminate the need for full-time Network Control Officer (NCO) staff to be located in Mayfield. Details of the specific change arrangements required by this initiative are described in the Safety Case, Goal Structured Notation (GSN) diagrams and the Safety Assurance Reports (SAR) as generated by the safety assurance team.

UGLRL's EMP considers:

a) the types or classes of credible emergency situations;

b) the consequences of each type or class of those emergencies, including estimates of the likely magnitude and severity of the effects of each type or class;

c) the risks to safety arising from those emergencies;

d) methods to mitigate the effects of those emergencies;

e) initial response procedures for dealing with those emergencies and the management of rescue services;

f) recovery procedures (as described in Appendix 4) for the restoration of railway infrastructure and/or operations and the assistance of people affected by the occurrence of those emergencies;

g) the allocation of emergency management roles and responsibilities within UGLRL and between UGLRL and other organisations (TfNSW, CIMIC, Rolling Stock Operators [RSO's], Councils, regulators);

h) call out procedures;

i) the allocation of personnel for the on-site management of those emergencies;

j) procedures for liaison with relevant emergency services or combat agencies, including information about the circumstances in which the emergency services or combat agencies are to be immediately contacted;

k) procedures to ensure that emergency services or combat agencies are provided with all the information that is reasonably required to enable them to respond effectively;

l) procedures for effective communications, coordination and cooperation throughout the emergency response; and

m) procedures for ensuring site security and the preservation of evidence.

It is noted that some of these requirements are addressed in the IMP.

1.1 Reference documents

The following documents are referenced by or relate to this EMP:

Rail Safety National Law (as applies in NSW and the ACT),

Rail Safety National Law Regulations (as applies in NSW and the ACT),

State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW),

NSW EMPLAN and sub-plans,

ACT Emergency Plan and sub-plans; and applicable ACT legislation,

TfNSW Operations and Maintenance Deed and Scope of Works,

Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT),

CRN Network Rules and Procedures,

UGLRL Safety Interface Agreements (various),

Security Management Plan CRN-MPNM-RLS-459032646-245, as amended,

Incident Management Procedure CRN-PRC-RLS-459032646-206, as amended,

CRN-APP-CRI-001-01 EMT Activation checklist, as amended,

Enterprise Risk Register, as amended;

BowTie diagrams related to emergency response, as amended,

Safety Case, GSN and SAR related to the Remote Working project,

Emergency Management Team Duty Cards,

CNI 27 Fatality or Trauma on the CRN,

CNI 23 Transfer of Operations from NCC to NMC

Emergency Evacuation Plans for UGLRL Facilities, including Orange HO and NCC (in work)

Emergency Management Team Briefing Agenda; and

Emergency Contact List.

2 Purpose

This EMP for CY3 provides the governance framework for effective delivery of planning and preparedness for managing emergencies in the UGLRL business operations, specifically those affecting rail safety.

This EMP also specifically addresses the need for emergency evacuation procedures to be in place for the Orange HO and the Network Control Centre (NCC), to be commissioned in CY3 as part of the RMTC project.

Requirements for levels of response, guidance and directives related to UGLRL personnel, combat and emergency response agencies, regional councils, TfNSW, other RTO's and other stakeholders who may be impacted by an emergency affecting the CRN is covered by the IMP. The EMP and IMP are related insofar as the EMP dictates the required structure in which the IMP can be effectively applied.

Application of the IMP (as opposed to activation of this EMP) enables UGLRL to respond in a coordinated and controlled manner to an emergency, however it must be noted that the IMP is effectively utilised on a daily basis as the business manages routine network-related incidents through the Network Control Officers (NCOs).

The purpose of managing the response to an emergency event is to:

- contain the situation so as to prevent escalation of the emergency and minimise the consequences;

- provide assistance as quickly as possible to those persons affected by the emergency;

- facilitate the preservation of evidence so that the incident may be investigated to establish the contributing factors and root cause to prevent recurrence; and

- facilitate the efficient restoration of normal services in a coordinated manner with the recovery procedures.

3 Objectives

The objective of this EMP for CY3 is to provide an auditable framework for the planning and structure required to be in place within UGLRL to ensure the appropriate level of emergency response, notification, escalation and thresholds for activation of the Emergency Management Team (EMT) and the requirements for emergency exercise scenario planning and preparation are known.

This includes:

- Outlining EMT roles and responsibilities as well as communications processes (see Appendix 1);

- Outlining the roles and responsibilities of other positions in the organisation that impact emergency preparedness (see Appendix 1);

- Detail the need for emergency scenario exercise(s) to be undertaken in CY3; and

- Describe the reporting, training and accountabilities within the emergency management system.

The EMP assigns roles and responsibilities to those who are required to:

- respond at the incident site;

- ensure the status of the incident is well known to senior management personnel (and the EMT if and when activated);

- make decisions to assist in the response and recovery;

- assign responsibilities to key staff and provide the necessary resources, and

- provide support to response personnel.

4 Emergency Preparedness

The CEO is responsible for ensuring UGLRL is prepared to respond to credible emergency threats.

The CEO must appropriately delegate responsibility for ensuring emergency exercises occur annually to test the effectiveness of the EMP, using credible and foreseeable scenarios involving multi-agency responses. The EMT reviews the findings to rectify any weaknesses in the planned arrangements and monitor the effectiveness of the plan for those nominated to respond to an emergency. This delegation has been made to the Head of HSE.

For emergencies that affect UGLRL (whether impacting the rail corridor or not), the NMC at Mayfield (prior to implementation of the remote working from the Orange NCC[1]) enacts the emergency response through the utilisation of the on-call list. This EMP outlines the roles and responsibilities for staff that have the capacity to respond.

Following the commissioning of the RMTC project and 24/7 occupation of the Orange NCC, the Mayfield NMC will act as the roll-back option in the case of failure of the NCC and is to remain available to provide emergency response coordination. In this case, the NMC will be staffed by contract NCO's who are to be available at short notice and rostered to attend the Mayfield NMC. In circumstances where an emergency condition arises that does not result in the NCC becoming disabled, emergency services coordination will remain at the NCC.

In the event that the NMC suffers a failure, a legacy Disaster Recovery Site (DRS) at Mayfield West exists that would require activation to provide emergency network control functions in lieu until the NMC is re-established[2]. This is addressed in specific procedures relevant to the Train Control Manager (TCM) and Head of Network Operations.

UGLRL has established the following resources to support the satisfactory implementation of this EMP:

- The EMT;
- Delegated attendees at Regional Emergency Management Committee (REMC) meetings; and
- SME personnel in key network operational, safety, risk and asset management positions.

Emergency evacuation procedural documents for the Orange HO, and for the proposed NCC occupation post-commissioning of the RMTC solution, will be finalised in CY3. Additionally, the development of CRN Network Instructions (CNI) for Transfer of Operations from NCC to NMC that addresses evacuation of NCO's and Duty Technician staff from the secure control room is currently in work.

5 General

5.1 Consultation and Accessibility

UGLRL is required to provide access to the latest approved version of this document to all internal and external stakeholders who are required to implement or respond to it.

UGLRL is also required to consult with workers and other stakeholders in the event that significant changes to the EMP are enabled, including but not limited to:

- Other RTOs who may be affected by the changes to the EMP for their railway operations (as defined in the relevant Safety Interface Agreement [SIA]);
- Any of the following if they are required to assist in implementing the EMP:
  - An entity (whether publicly or privately owned) that provides, or intends to provide, water, sewerage, drainage, gas, electricity, telephone, telecommunications or other services under the authority of an Act of NSW or the ACT;
  - Any person who, under the authority of an Act, is permitted to own or use a pipeline, or is licensed to construct or operate a pipeline; or
- Combat Agencies.

Ongoing consultation with one or more of these parties occurs through UGLRL's attendance at REMC meetings. These REMCs are distributed across the CRN with committees representing the NSW regions of Central West, New England, Riverina and Monaro/ACT. Stakeholders who are part of the

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[1] Successful transition of remote network control operations from the NMC to the NCC will be a critical component of the CY3 activities and will be undertaken during a brief network shutdown under possession or at a time of least rail traffic density.

[2] The DRS is currently not in an operational stand-by condition. TfNSW now assume responsibility for this asset, based on the 4 March 2024 announcement that the Sigview TCS program is cancelled.

REMC group who require access to the EMP will define the level of access they require to meet their obligation to provide an appropriate emergency response to UGLRL.

The UGLRL Head of HSE coordinates delegates to attend the REMC meetings to represent UGLRL's interests. Attendance at these meetings enables ongoing information to be exchanged in relation to risks associated with emergency management as it may affect UGLRL. Correspondence related to UGLRL's interaction with REMC bodies is retained in Sharepoint and any issues arising that require EMT review are escalated for attention.

Initially, in accordance with the IMP, communication streams in relation to an emergency are established between responding agencies and UGLRL Network Control. This line of communication following an emergency is to be maintained until first responders arrive, an On Site Coordinator (OSC) is assigned and assumes responsibility for liaison between the response agencies and the required UGLRL stakeholders (eg, NCO's).

Personnel, including contractors, who have a role in the implementation of the EMP are to be made aware of the EMP content or any significant changes to the EMP and their respective responsibilities described therein. All persons allocated responsibility within the EMP are provided with information to effectively implement it.

5.2 Identification of Emergency Types

As part of the hazard identification process embedded in UGLRL railway operations, potential emergency situations are identified and recorded in the UGLRL BowTies (as Top Events and/or Consequences).

UGLRL have identified Top Events (a condition where control is lost) that may represent typical potential emergency types that could impact the CRN and result in significant (societal concern) consequences. These have been modelled using BowTie diagrams in accordance with the risk management framework. The most extreme instances of emergencies may result in loss of business continuity, requiring an additional level of organisational intervention.

> **NOTE: Business Continuity events are not specifically addressed in this EMP. Refer to the UGLRL Business Continuity Management Plan (BCMP) for further details.**

Credible Top Events include:

- Loss of separation between rail vehicles (primarily train-to-train at speed or between a moving and a stationery train) (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Loss of separation between trains and road vehicle (primarily busses or heavy vehicles) (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Derailment of passenger or freight train at speed (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Structural failure of overbridge, underbridge, culvert or embankment/cutting impacting a train (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Structural failure of lineside or other infrastructure impacting a train (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Fire, explosion, flood or earthquake resulting in loss of asset integrity or impacting trains (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Hazardous chemical spills, dangerous goods or poisonous gas loss of containment from rolling stock, UGLRL facilities or activities or Third Party activities (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Restricted or inadequate access to incident locations resulting in escalation of a less significant incident into an emergency (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Failure of the Mayfield NMC[3] (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Failure of the Orange NCC (as the RMTC facility);

- Serious multiple injured persons or loss of life of one or more employees, a representative from another RTO or a member of the public (multiple potential mechanisms);

- Security event impacting multiple facilities, locations or services (multiple potential mechanisms)[4]; and

- Cyber security events related to the RMTC project communications links between the NMC and the NCC (multiple mechanisms)[5].

Appendix 2 Types and Classes of Emergencies provides an extended list of the UGLRL specific types of emergencies, along with potential consequences and likely magnitude and severity.

5.3 Risk Assessment and Mitigation

Provided in *Appendix 3 Risks and Mitigations* is a detail risk assessment and list of mitigation controls for each of the UGLRL specific types of emergency events.

5.4 Identify Resources Required

Planning for emergency response to situations must cover the various credible scenarios identified. Credible events may occur also as a result of a Top Event, examples being a fire following a train derailment due to a bridge collapse. Each one of these components may otherwise have triggered an emergency response if occurring singularly.

Resources to be planned include back-up personnel, communications equipment, alternate worker accommodation or facilities, degraded mode network operations requirements and emergency equipment. UGLRL is not a combat agency and is not by law required to engage in combatting emergency conditions. UGLRL is required however, as a PCBU, to provide a safe workplace and that obligation extends to ensuring that injured employees are safely removed from the path of danger and others are prevented from being exposed to harm in an uncontrolled environment. The engagement of external resources is therefore required to ensure effective emergency combat response occurs.

Network Control is the entity through which most emergencies would be reported, and it is the NCO who receives the initial call and who instigates the appropriate emergency response as is necessary. The NCO utilises the emergency response contact list to activate the most appropriate UGLRL resources based on location and type of incident. The NCO ensures as many details concerning the incident are recorded accurately for onforwarding. This is a critical process step that ensures resources are directed to the correct location and be prepared for circumstances at the site.

As defined in the IMP, and as per the requirements in the CRN Network Rules and Procedures (CNRP) for Network Incident Report (NIR) generation, the NCO *must*, to the extent possible:

- Record the true nature of the incident (in broad terms);

- Record the exact network location (kilometrage, closest network location or settlement);

- Record the number and extent of injuries (if any);

- Record the train number (if a RSO train is involved);

- Identify and record the first responder details;

- Confirm which external emergency resources are required; and

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[3] Specific failures of systems within the Orange NCC (when commissioned for remote working) are to be managed through specific Network Operations fail-over procedures that, when implemented correctly, do not constitute an emergency scenario. Failure of both NCC and NMC simultaneously whilst no availability exists for credible alternatives, would constitute a BC event.

[4] Widespread and long-term security incidents constitute a Business Continuity event.

[5] Addressed in the Security Management Plan and the (draft) Cyber Incident Response Plan (CIRP)

- Ensure that any approaching rail movements are immediately notified and rail access to the area is prevented through section blocks.

A UGLRL OSC is to be assigned, usually from the first responder group. The NCO ensures the TCM and Head of Network Operations are notified and if and when the incident is escalated to an emergency level, the CEO ensures the EMT is activated.

Access to the respective REMC contacts is provided to the NCOs and will also be available to UGLRL personnel who may need to access the contact details.

The emergency response contact list includes contact details of the following resources:

- Regional Fire, Police and Ambulance services,
- TCM and Head of Network Operations,
- Adjoining Rail Infrastructure Managers (RIMs), safety representative and emergency coordinator contact details,
- EPA (NSW and/or ACT offices) and hazardous chemical authorities (for sites where particular hazards have been identified),
- Service utility authorities who manage service crossings where applicable,
- All RSO's who have services on or approaching network boundaries to the CRN in affected areas,
- CIMIC and TfNSW representatives,
- Telecommunications service providers,
- Local councils in affected areas,
- The Office of Environment and Heritage,
- Neighbouring properties affected by UGLRL activities or those that could impact UGLRL.

Note that it is the responsibility of the Head of HSE (or delegated position) to ensure ONRSR, OTSI or ATSB representatives are made aware, however those agencies usually nominate their intended level of involvement and attendance in any case.

Emergency equipment shall adequately cover all realistically foreseeable emergency scenarios identified above. Frequent testing and ongoing maintenance of this equipment is essential to ensure its operability.

Equipment may include:

- Effective communication equipment (including satellite phones if in remote areas),
- Auxiliary communication equipment,
- Rolling stock recovery equipment (for UGLRL rolling stock only),
- Emergency equipment fitout in hi-rails, trucks and on-track rolling stock,[6]
- Suitably trained first responder staff (Infrastructure Maintenance personnel),
- Spill kits,
- Hazmat equipment (limited scope),
- Fire-fighting equipment (to control small fires) usually associated with rail welding, grinding or cutting operations,

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[6] UGLRL is not required to maintain combat-ready emergency response vehicles or equipment.

- Medical supplies (limited to mandatory First Aid supplies),

- Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),

- Power generators and lighting equipment, and

- Other ancillary items that equip supply trucks.

The assessment of the emergency equipment required, and its deployment in emergency training scenarios, should be undertaken by a suitably competent person and is described in the IMP.   During the assessment, records of the assessment together with the evidence of the assessor competencies should be taken and added to the respective records management system, and the applicable UGLRL Training Register.

Table 5.1 below lists the required assessments and competencies to be held for each category of equipment.

Equipment	Assessment Responsibility	Competence
Spill Kits and Pollution response equipment	Manager HSE (or delegate)	As per Environmental competency
Fire extinguishers and blankets	Depot or Office Manager	Fire warden training
Fire hose reels	Depot or Office Manager	Trained NSW rural fire fighter
Defibrillator	Depot or Office Manager	First aid training or otherwise competent
First Aid kit	Depot or Office Manager	First aid training
Machinery, plant and equipment	Qualified operator	Relevant plant competency ticket/license
Emergency Vehicles	All	Driver's licence
Rescue Kits	Team leaders	Trained in associated rescue kit including working at heights, confined space and electrical isolation

Table 5.1:   Assessment and competency requirements for equipment types.

5.5 Assignment of Responsibilities for Emergency Situations and Planning

Appendix 1 and Duty Cards define the responsibilities of key stakeholders in the planning for and delivery of emergency management in UGLRL.

When appointing persons to key roles, UGLRL is to ensure that the persons assigned have the required knowledge of the operations and of the resources available to deal with such emergencies.

5.6 Plan Testing - Emergency Scenario Exercise

The CEO and EMT shall ensure that scheduled emergency scenario exercises are planned and carried out so that the appropriate personnel (such as Duty Card holders) are aware of the procedures in actual situations.   This responsibility may be delegated through the Head of HSE as owner of the rail SMS.

Emergency training and exercising is essential to ensuring UGLRL workers are competent in managing an incident that impacts UGLRL's people, the public, the environment, UGLRL or TfNSW property or

reputation. UGLRL's training includes individual and team training and an annual exercise. Participation in desktop and/or mock exercises is deemed sufficient for annual training upon completion of the initial training.

When developing the program for desktop and mock exercises, consideration is given to inviting external emergency services, regulatory bodies and TfNSW to participate and observe the exercise and outcomes. This is particularly important during CY3 and delivery of the remote working project, where new facilities and physical and cyber system interfaces are introduced, requiring familiarisation of response requirements demanded by the facility and system configurations.

Emergency management training is to occur as follows:

- NCO training upon appointment and as identified,

- Line Management (Supervisor, Superintendent) training upon appointment and annually, and

- EMT members are to undertake training upon appointment and annually.

The CEO, in conjunction with the EMT, shall ensure that scheduled emergency exercises have a de-briefing session (critical response analysis). The EMP is updated to ensure continuous improvement and streamlining of process for subsequent annual periods. Emergency scenarios identified in the risk assessment process will be recorded and formally passed to the EMT for incorporation in future EMP planning periods. For the purpose of conducting emergency exercises and drills, there is to be an Emergency Scenario form completed as required.

The emergency scenario proposed for CY3 delivery is detailed below:

- *A heavy vehicle travelling from Orange to Dubbo fails to negotiate the approach curve on Burrendong Way to the level crossing at Mumbil (387.691km) which is protected by Type F lights and bells (no boom gates), which are operating at the time due to the approach from the south of XPT service WT27 to Dubbo. The heavy vehicle was (assumed to be) attempting to beat the train across the level crossing;*

- *The heavy vehicle overturns, destroying the approach guard rails and level crossing signals and comes to rest foul of the track;*

- *WP27 is travelling at line speed (approx. 100kph) but is unable to significantly reduce its speed before colliding with the overturned heavy vehicle (WT27 is running to schedule and incident occurs approx. 1330hrs);*

- *The lead power car (XP2001) and the first trailing carriage are derailed and roll onto their sides;*

- *The impact of the collision results in multiple injuries to the single RTC, on-board Passenger Services staff and several passengers, requiring multiple medical and emergency response services to attend;*

- *The heavy vehicle driver is fatally injured;*

- *Hazardous material carried by the heavy vehicle and diesel from the ruptured fuel tank of XP2001 is uncontained due to the collision and requires Fire agencies to attend;*

- *Police and SES resources attend to provide site management, traffic control and recovery.*

This scenario therefore requires the initiation of the EMT, advice to UGL and CIMIC of the incident and fatality/injuries, engagement of regulators and other authorities and TfNSW. It is proposed that this exercise be conducted in CY3 Q4.

5.6.1 Network Operations RMTC Scenario

With particular reference to the RMTC project establishing the NCC as a remote node from the NMC, CY3 planning requires an emergency roll-back/evacuation scenario exercise be conducted to test preparedness for operation of the product and facilities (pending RMTC delivery in CY3). The Head of Network Operations and TCM are required to construct and propose the scope of the scenario(s) to be tested, noting that transfer of staff and operations between the NCC and NMC (in the event of a remote

KVM systems or accessibility failure) to provide a continuous network control function does not in of itself constitute an emergency situation. That event/process is part of the operational readiness checklist of activities that is supported by a particular CNI and procedure required for commissioning and must still be tested/enabled as a separate exercise.

Therefore, the following potential emergency exercise scenarios may be applicable:

- Transfer of operations from NCC to NMC and escalation of 'warm stand-by' mode for the DRS to achieve on-line status due to catastrophic failure of systems whilst in NCO and other staff are in transit;

- Fire or explosion at Orange NCC resulting in casualties and loss of systems and train operational data;

- Major security breach at the NCC or NMC results in NCO's taken hostage, access is prevented and operations compromised; or

- Train control system functionality failures or wrong-side failures affect multiple corridors.

5.7 Plan Testing and Review

The EMP content is aligned with the Contract Year terms, this being CY3. Reviews are therefore to be conducted annually in a similar alignment and in accordance with HSE standards and guidelines. Each CY EMP's effectiveness is assessed as part of the annual SMS review, with particular focus on the content of the annual exercise scenario and outcomes. Reviews will be completed by the Head of HSE, selected SLT members and approved by the CEO, noting that the SMS Review is typically undertaken in January and the end of CY occurs mid-calendar year.

Testing the effectiveness of emergency response and preparedness occurs through a combination of desktop audits, internal role familiarisation and exercises in conjunction with external response agencies.

An emergency exercise plan is prepared in consultation with affected parties such as:

- Response agencies,

- Government agencies,

- Other RTOs,

- Providers of utility services such as water, sewerage, electricity or telecommunications, or providers of public services,

- Any person who is permitted to own or use a pipeline, or is licensed to construct a pipeline, and

- Providers of non-rail public transport modes (where modal interchange hubs are located).

Participants in these exercises may include these consulted parties and other stakeholders as required by legislation. Specifically in preparation for the remote working project commissioning and the conduct of the Network Operations exercise, particular stakeholders may also include other Functional Groups of UGL (eg, UGL Engineering) or suppliers to them.

The EMP or components of it are tested to ensure the plan is effective at intervals determined by the UGLRL Head of HSE. The frequency of testing is to be at least annually, and otherwise based on:

- the extent and frequency of amendments to the EMP (multiple triggering events for EMP amendments);

- the extent and frequency of amendments to response agency work practices or personnel changes; and

- the extent and frequency of changes to legislation affecting emergency management requirements.

6   Coordination

The coordination and delivery of the EMP, including the management of incidents, is split into both preparation and response.   Delivery of the EMP uses a tiered approach based on escalation of the event from an incident to an emergency and then to a crisis[7].

Table 6.1 below describes the different teams and accountabilities.

Level of Response	Accountable management	Colour Code/ Level	Team Activation triggers	TfNSW Reference
Nil –proactive preparing and monitoring of the EMP	Risk and Assurance Manager, Interface Manager, Head of HSE, SLT and EMT delegates as required.	1	SMS Review, O&M Deed deliverable, Accreditation requirement	O&M Deed CDRL
Any event on the network that is managed locally	On-call Supervisors (all Infrastructure Maintenance disciplines), NCO's, TCM, HSE group	2	Incident reported (Notifiable Occurrence)	Minor or Major Incident
Emergency event or escalated incident requiring significant UGLRL operational response/evacuation	Fire Wardens, Emergency Management Team (EMT)* Refer to Duty Cards	3	Combat agencies engaged	Emergency Incident
Emergency event or escalated incident requiring significant integrated response between UGLRL, CIMIC, TfNSW or other external stakeholders	Executive Crisis Team (ECT)**	4	Combat agencies engaged and media involved	Emergency Incident

Table 6.1:   Team accountabilities.

*Also refer to *CRN-APP-CRI-001-01 EMT Activation Checklist* for the Emergency/incident Management Team and TfNSW Procedure *CRN-S-P001 Incident and Failure Notification Procedure*.

**ECT accountabilities yet to be determined.

Figure 6.1 below illustrates the relationship between response actions and the controls provided by hierarchical plans as Consequence severity increases.

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[7] A crisis event is most likely to constitute a BC event, where continued operations of UGLRL are unsustainable for an extended period of time.

Figure 6.1:   Relationship model between Actions, Controls and Consequences.

6.1 Safety and Environment Committee

The UGLRL Head of HSE participates in the activities of the Safety and Environment Committee (SEC). The SEC reports to the UGLRL Board.   The Terms of Reference outline the duties of the SEC, which include but are not limited to:

a) monitoring the effectiveness of the EMP and the Security Management Plan (SMP);

b) monitoring advancement in technologies with a strategic view to emergency and security system development and improvement for safety and environment-critical systems;

c) provision of feedback to the Risk and Assurance Manager by applying the emergency and security response and preparedness controls to the identified hazard threats and events;

d) reviewing the effectiveness and relevance of controls and defenses listed within the Enterprise Barrier Register (EBR), via the Risk and Assurance Manager;

e) conducting post incident reviews of incidents and the effectiveness of the emergency response and/or security occurrences from investigation reports;

f) developing an audit schedule for highest risk activities, including measuring or checking the compliance and effectiveness of this EMP and the SMP;

g) preparing the EMP/SMP in consultation with UGLRL management, emergency service providers, accredited RSOs, local councils, TfNSW and listed stakeholders;

h) reviewing the results and provide a written report from the findings of the emergency exercises to the emergency service providers, accredited RSOs, local councils, TfNSW and listed stakeholders and the UGLRL Board;

i) conducting emergency and security exercises,

j) making recommendations from the results of emergency and security exercises; and

k) reporting to the Board on the matters identified above quarterly, and to consider such other emergency or security-related topics as may be requested by the Board.

6.2 Event Response Team (ERT)

The role of the ERT is to undertake the initial in-field response to an emergency incident and determine the appropriate escalation.   The ERT is not a combat agency.   The response to events such as minor incidents and injuries on worksites are described further in the IMP.

The objectives of the ERT are to:

- Identify an OSC and confirm the actions required of that person;

- Protect UGLRL employees, contractors, other impacted persons, the environment and assets from further damage or harm to the extent possible;

- Coordinate internal UGLRL response actions to contain and control the UGLRL assets and personnel (including evacuations);

- Ensure the Incident Controller correctly liaises with the NCO;

- Ensure the Combat Agency Site Controller is provided with all relevant information required to assist the site and incident containment and recovery;

- Barricade the incident scene and prevent unapproved access as required to protect evidence of the incident causal factors and incident environment;

- Inform and obtain the necessary support and resources from the EMT and immediate Line Manager;

- Provide on-site support to responding agencies and the EMT as required;

- Keep the Line Manager and EMT informed of the incident with relevant and timely information; and

- Re-open the incident site following directions as may be delivered by the combat agency who controls the site and/or the relevant Regulator following their release of the site.

6.3 Emergency Management Team

The purpose of the EMT is to provide a senior level, controlled and predictable management response to the coordination of an emergency incident as determined and directed by the CEO and in response to ERT information.   The UGLRL CEO acts as the EMT Leader or, if unavailable, a Senior Manager from a relevant Functional Group, as nominated by the CEO.   The authority of the CEO is required to be delegated to the EMT leader in order to direct and coordinate the effective response to an emergency incident.

The composition of the EMT will be influenced by the nature of the event and the resources and expertise required to manage the incident.   The decision on the composition of the team rests with the EMT Leader with advice from subject matter experts (SME's).

Role allocation for the EMT is as described in Appendix 1.   Duty Cards for each role exist and they detail the critical responsibilities and required actions of the Duty Card holder in the event of an emergency.

Figure 6.2 below provides an emergency management organisation structure, functional separation and information flow diagram to assist in the visualization of actions arising from an incident that escalates to an emergency.   The EMT Duty Card holder responsibilities are to be interpreted as facilitating the flow of information within this structure.

Figure 6.2:   Incident information flow and response structure

6.4 Protocols

6.4.1 Event and Incident Response

Refer to Figure 6.2 above.

As part of the initial incident response, the NCO utilises the On Call list to ensure the OSC is responsive and the correct response agencies are contacted and responding.   The NCO is not required to notify regulatory bodies.   This is managed by the Head of HSE or a suitable delegate within the HSE group.

Notification of an event involving UGLRL regardless of whether the event is a rail incident or not must be made to the NCO.   Please refer to *CNI-11 Report Network Control Incidents*.

6.4.2 Initial Notification and Response

Initial notification of incidents to the NMC (or NCC once commissioned) may be made by rail traffic crews (RTC), station staff, rail safety workers, members of the public, State Emergency Services, Police, Ambulance, Fire and Rescue NSW and the ACT as well as the Rural Fire Service.

It is the responsibility of the NCO who receives an incident call to ensure that the individual (where that individual is a UGLRL employee, RTC or combat agent):

- As accurately as possible assesses the situation and nature of the incident;

- Provides all known information to the NCO;

- Seeks to immediately ensure the safety of others;

- Seeks to immediately take steps to preserve the scene;

- Seeks assistance from other workers as required;

- Renders first aid to injured personnel, provided it is safe to do so;

- Maintains communications with the NCO and fulfil the role of first responder until relieved by the appointed UGLRL Rail Incident Commander;

- Directs emergency services to the scene and conducts a handover brief (if Emergency Service response is required); and

- be prepared to support responding agencies and Investigating Agencies.

NOTE: The appointed EMT Coordinator is to respond only to contact with the UGLRL CEO and NCO's. The UGLRL CEO or delegate is to be the single point of contact for information if the wider business requires updates.

UGLRL EMT is responsible for processing information from on-site combat agencies and the UGLRL OSC for the purposes of keeping TfNSW, ONRSR, OTSI, EPA and other authorities informed of incident status (progress, escalation or recovery phases).

These notifications occur via one or more of the following methods:

- Written correspondence[8],

- Emails and text messages where appropriate[9],

- Website updates,

- ONRSR/TfNSW Portal inputs (eg, NIR records),

- Radio and television (including news articles as appropriate),

- Community meetings, or

- Door knocking.

6.4.3 Network Control Immediate Actions

The NCO records all relevant information as is provided through the initial emergency call and subsequent calls from those in the field.   This allows correct identification of the incident type and severity and assist in managing the immediate response by coordinating the prevention of rail traffic from approaching an area of danger and notification to internal and external emergency response agencies.   Depending on severity this action may occur prior to calling response personnel or emergency services.

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[8] A hierarchy of correspondence is established that requires specific stakeholders to be formally advised in writing after initial phone calls or emails are provided.

[9] The EMT will have a formal email distribution list that it is to use for broadcasting of similar message content to recipients.

If access to the CRN rail corridor is required by a response agency or emergency service, contact with the NCO is required prior to entry into the corridor.   The intent is to enable the NCO to confirm to those requiring access that all approaching rail traffic has been blocked for the duration of the emergency access period or until it is safe to again allow rail traffic to pass.

The NCO shall complete the actions described in Figure 6.4 below in accordance with the relevant Country Network Instruction (CNIF 1):

Figure 6.4:   NCO response steps (also refer to Figure 6.3 and Appendix 1).

6.4.4   Site security and preservation of evidence

Following the determination of an emergency, the NCO in consultation with the person reporting the event appoints an appropriate OSC who becomes responsible for rail safety protection of the site in accordance with the CNRP for emergencies.

The site is to be secured and left without interference until authority to start the recovery process has been obtained from the Emergency Response Agency, Combat Agency, ONRSR, ATSB or OTSI as appropriate.   The exception to this is to allow for the safe and timely removal of any injured persons or the preservation of life and in certain circumstances, preservation of the environment.   Evidence pertinent to the investigation of the incident must be preserved and protected from interference to the extent possible.

If an unsafe situation exists, steps must be taken to evacuate persons as required and secure the site.   These steps must consider the potential impact of the unsafe condition and ensure that exclusion zones have been implemented to prevent any additional risks to safety.

Following the resolution of the immediate emergency, an investigation must be commenced consistent with the UGLRL investigation process.   This is to be initiated by the Head of HSE and independent of and additional to any investigation initiated by an authority or RSO involved.   Evidence that is required for use in internal or external investigations is collected and recorded by an appointed UGLRL representative.   A person appointed by the EMT (or as delegated by the Head of HSE) is responsible for coordinating the evidence required by external parties.

Other investigations may take place by regulatory bodies, which are:

- Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR),
- Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI),
- Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB),
- WorkSafe NSW or WorkSafe ACT,
- Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH), or
- EPA (ACT and NSW)

If the Police declare the emergency site a crime scene, the site is closed to enable the police and/or response agencies to carry out investigations.   The site is not to be accessed until released by the Police.

6.4.4.1 Combat Agency or Emergency Service Access to the Rail Corridor

If a person is injured at a worksite and that event does not affect the safety of others or railway operations, the OSC must call '000' and request ambulance services to attend. The Site Manager arranges for the ambulance to be escorted into the incident site and relevant worksite protection to be implemented and advises the NCO and the EMT of these arrangements.

If access to an operational rail corridor is required by a response agency or emergency service for a non-rail incident, contact with NCOs at the NMC/NCC is required by the response agency or emergency service prior to entry into the corridor. This enables the NCO to provide suitable site protection through applying blocks until notified that the response agency or emergency service has cleared the rail corridor.

6.4.5 Communication of the EMP

UGLRL has an obligation to ensure the EMP information is made available to relevant external stakeholders. The EMP is required to be communicated with the REMC and attending emergency service organisations. The CEO ensures that relevant stakeholders, as part of their EMT responsibilities, undertake this process. Delegation of this responsibility sits with the Head of HSE.

Where significant quantities of chemicals are stored, or as otherwise required under law, the EMP is shared with local emergency services to ensure their familiarity with the respective sites. This is particularly a requirement with the proposed commissioning of the Orange NCC as a remote working facility, which has specific accessibility and security requirements to be observed by third parties.

Communication sessions are important in the effective response to an emergency to minimise potential danger to personnel and property. A fundamental level of awareness of the EMP content amongst all UGLRL employees and contractors is required to be provided and maintained.

Communications mechanisms include:

- Accessibility to Sharepoint folder sites that retain relevant documents for employees,
- New employee inductions,
- Refresher inductions,
- Toolbox meetings,
- HSR forums,
- HSE Communications,
- Safety Alerts, and
- EMT meetings.

6.5 Emergency Management Team Facilities and Resources

Detailed in Table 6.1 below is a list of the key resources and administrative processes associated with event and emergency management response.

Type	Description
Access and Equipment	The response team establishes a fixed, safe and appropriate base facility as near to the incident scene as possible from which its response coordination activities are conducted.
	• The response team has:
	• Access to copies of relevant information relating to assisting in the incident response (eg, safe rail corridor access paths, Call-out phone lists);
	• OSC Duty Cards;

Type	Description
	• Logs for recording of incident timeline information and other relevant data; and • Communications equipment that may include satellite phones to ensure network-wide coverage.
Incident Management room	The Incident Management Room (IMR) is the focal point of the EMT's incident response. An IMR may be established in Level 2 of the UGLRL Office at 161 Kite St, Orange or at Bathurst (1 Piper Street)[10]. Breakout Rooms are to be set up and used by team members to allow them to complete tasks, conduct planning and correspond away from the IMR if and as required.
Crisis: Rehabilitation and Counselling	Post incident Rehabilitation and Counselling must be arranged in accordance with UGLRL rehabilitation procedures, Return to Work Program, and the Employee Assistance Program (EAP).
Evacuation diagrams	Each site Safety Management Plan (SMP) must have specific evacuation diagrams and information to assist safety management at that site/facility. Where necessary, each SMP must include the actions required to evacuate any persons who may require additional assistance during an emergency. An Emergency Evacuation Plan must be developed, agreed, and tested as part of the routine testing arrangements. Fire Wardens or HSR staff may be tasked to coordinate such testing arrangements. Each SMP must include guidelines for employees who need access to UGLRL premises/sites after normal working hours. The Orange NCC (when commissioned) must have a specific CNI and Evacuation Management Plan that relates to the NCO, Duty Technician and any other staff present.

Table 6.1:   EMT facilities and resources required.

6.6 Records

Emergency incident (and investigation) records, and records of all emergency exercises, are to be maintained according to the *NSW State Records Act of 1998* and include:

- Emergency Management Actions (corrective and preventative),

- Emergency exercise plans,

- Emergency exercise reports, including information relating to:

  o Attendees,

  o scope of the exercise(s),

  o findings made as part of an exercise,

  o local conditions,

  o timing and results of any evacuations conducted,

  o preparedness of all participants,

  o response agency control and management outcomes, and

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[10] If and when commissioned as a DRF facility.

- o exercise recommendations from reports.
- Actual emergency incident investigation reports, specifically including information pertaining to the emergency nature of the incident, such as:
  - o Evacuations required,
  - o details of any injuries or fatalities,
  - o safety risks arising from the initial emergency event,
  - o contributing factors to the emergency,
  - o contributing factors to any failings or deficiencies in the management or response,
  - o any records that may be required for Safety Performance Indicator reporting needs and rail safety regulatory obligations,
  - o details of lessons learnt and improvement opportunities, and
  - o any recommendations to improve UGLRL's emergency response capability.

Records of incidents and associated information (investigation reports) are held in one or more of the following:

- NIR databases (4ABS);
- RFI's to RSO's in response to incidents;
- Notifiable Occurrence (Category A, B, C and N) spreadsheets for periodic reporting;
- Synergy incident database;
- Sharepoint folders (investigations for internal and/or external reporting);
- ONRSR Portal submissions; and
- Monthly/quarterly and annual TfNSW and ONRSR reports (eg, Annual Safety Performance Report).

The effective management of records is the responsibility of the CEO, delegated to each Functional Group Manager in relation to the records generated and accessed by that Functional Group. The Head of HSE ensures that records required to be presented to regulators are controlled as per element 6 of the Rail SMS.

6.7 Training

Training is provided to ensure that appropriate numbers of staff (and the appropriate classifications of trained staff) are trained to respond to foreseeable and credible emergencies at all levels. The training modules for each classification level are included in the training 'matrix' in accordance with the Training and Competence Procedure (maintained by Head of People and Culture).

Examples of specific training are:

- General inductions for UGLRL employees (site-specific evacuation procedures and UGLRL emergency management and incident reporting systems),
- Specific position-based induction material related to Operational or Engineering Authority holders or Officers/Duty holders,
- Emergency control organisation training (for those actively appointed to the EMT),
- Duty Card holder familiarisation and awareness,
- Emergency/Security management awareness through 1-on-1 discussions with new staff or those transferring internally into new roles (if relevant),

- Incident reporting (to internal and external stakeholders, eg, ONRSR) including NCO's, TCM, Superintendents/Supervisors and HSE staff,

- On-call Civil and Signals staff training as assigned by Infrastructure Maintenance Superintendents,

- Fire fighting/fire extinguisher training (Fire Wardens and specific Infrastructure Maintenance staff),

- Evacuation processes (for nominated Fire Wardens and/or Depot Managers),

- First aid training (for nominated First Aiders), and

- Environmental hazardous material Spill kit training.

Records of training undertaken, and associated validity periods are kept in the respective training register or database and monitored to ensure currency.

Appendix 1 Stakeholder Responsibilities

The following table identifies and summarises the responsibilities of key UGLRL stakeholder groups or individuals related to emergency preparedness and response.

Position	Responsibilities
CEO	• Ensure proper governance of the EMT as the EMT Leader (Duty Card holder) and proper delivery of the EMP, • Determine the composition of the EMT to be enabled, taking into account the nature of the emergency event, • EMT Leader is required to consult with the ERT Leader and the EMT Coordinator, on activation of the EMT, • Provide funding for all required resources to support delivery of the EMP, • Nominate delegate to act as EMT Leader if CEO is unavailable, • Nominate an EMT Log Keeper (EA position, or alternate), • Ensure each Functional Group Manager is aware of and held accountable for delivery of their responsibilities, • Ensure each Functional Group Manager allocates Emergency Management Control roles and responsibilities as required, and • Ensure the UGLRL Board is kept aware of any information it may require for upwards reporting and the determination of a proper corporate response.
Safety and Environment Committee	• Ensure adequate and appropriate information is readily available to the CEO to provide to the Board related to any emergency situation as per the IMP and EMP, • Ensure evidence exists of the conduct of Training and Drills in accordance with the EMP requirements, • Meet to discuss EMP requirements as regularly as is deemed necessary, particularly considering changes to operations, activities or key personnel, • Ensure all records associated with Emergency Activities are made available and kept in the specified records management system (delegated to Head of HSE), and • Monitor changes in the operations which may require the EMP to be updated.
UGLRL Board	• Ensure the SEC and CEO are providing adequate and appropriate levels of information and updates, based on the nature of the emergency, • Make clear and timely determinations as to the level of corporate support (finances, human resources, equipment and communications) required to be made available to UGLRL ERT, EMT and internal stakeholders, and • Ensure that UGL and CIMIC remain informed of the progress of the incident and UGLRL's response.
Head of HSE	• Ensure the EMP produced is in compliance with legislation and the relevant standards (e.g., AS3745 Planning for Emergencies in Facilities), • Ensure that the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment activities include emergency situations as described in BowTie documentation (delegated to Risk and Assurance Manager), • Provide advice to the Safety and Environment Committee as required, • Ensure external regulatory bodies are notified as required, • Ensure the EMP is readily available and accessible to all internal and external stakeholders, • Review the effectiveness of the EMP, • Delegate suitable attendees to participate at REMC meetings, • Initiate independent UGLRL investigations of emergency events as determined by the nature of the emergency,

Position	Responsibilities
	• Appoint a representative to collect and record the information and evidence required for future investigation of the incident by internal and external agencies, • Comply with the Duty Card obligations for the position as the EMT Coordinator, • Keep appropriate records of the functional group's emergency response activities and outcomes, and • Ensure all HSE staff members (and contractors) who report to the Head of HSE are familiar with the EMP content or have access to it for reference.
Head of Network Operations	• Ensure that all positional responsibilities as defined in the EMP as they relate to Network Operations emergency preparedness are identified and assigned to appropriate staff, • Ensure RSOs are notified as required, • Ensure that Emergency Evacuation Management Plans are established for the NMC and NCC and emergency evacuation exercises and drills are undertaken regularly at the NMC and NCC, • Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required as the EMT Network Operations Representative Duty Card holder, • Ensure the Emergency Agencies contact details are current and provided to the NMC and NCC for NCO reference, • Keep appropriate records of the functional group's emergency response activities and outcomes, and • Ensure all Network Operations staff members (and contractors) who report to the Head of Network Operations are familiar with the EMP content or have access to it for reference.
Head of Infrastructure Maintenance	• Ensure that all positional responsibilities as defined in the EMP as they relate to Infrastructure Maintenance emergency preparedness are identified and assigned to appropriate staff, • Ensure that Emergency Evacuation Management Plans are established for each Depot or maintenance facility and emergency evacuation exercises and drills are undertaken regularly at each Depot or maintenance facility, • Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations as the EMT Infrastructure Representative, • Ensure that sufficient On-call resources are rostered, • Ensure that On-call rostered staff are competent and capable of acting as an On-site Coordinator if required to respond, • Keep appropriate records of the functional group's emergency response activities and outcomes, and • Ensure all Infrastructure Maintenance staff members (and contractors) who report to the Head of Infrastructure Maintenance are familiar with the EMP content or have access to it for reference.
Head of Asset and Engineering Services	• Ensure that all positional responsibilities as defined in the EMP as they relate to Asset and Engineering Services emergency preparedness are identified and assigned to appropriate staff, • Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations for the position as EMT Engineering Representative, • Keep appropriate records of the functional group's emergency response activities and outcomes, and • Ensure all AES staff members (and contractors) who report to the Head of AES are familiar with the EMP content or have access to it for reference.
Head of People and Culture	• Comply with the Duty Card obligations for the position as the EMT People and Culture Representative,

Position	Responsibilities
	• Ensure Position Description documents identify any specific emergency management requirements for key staff, • Post incident Rehabilitation and Counselling arranged in accordance with UGLRL rehabilitation procedures, Return to Work Program, and the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), and • Keep appropriate records of the functional group's emergency response activities and outcomes
Communications and Stakeholder Relations Manager	• Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations as the EMT Communications Representative, • Ensure consistent and reliable information is provided to external stakeholders as per CIMIC policies.
Commercial and Finance Manager	• Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations as the EMT Finance Representative.
ICT Manager	• Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations as the EMT IT Representative, • Ensure the Incident Response Room is fully connected with all expected IT services.
HSE Manager	• Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations as the EMT Environmental Representative and as the EMT WHS Representative (or delegate as required).
Train Control Manager	• Implement Emergency Evacuation Management Plans as they apply to the network control facilities where NCO's are based; • Provide advice to the EMT and ERT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations as the EMT Rail Safety Representative, and • Ensure that the EMT is provided with all adequate and appropriate information as received from NCOs as soon as it is available.
Superintendent/Supervisor	• Implement Emergency Evacuation Management Plans as they apply to the facilities under their management and control; • Act as the ERT Site Manager, and • Provide advice to the EMT as required and comply with the Duty Card obligations as the EMT OSC Representative.
Depot/Office Manager	• Develop Site Safety Management Plans as appropriate, • Assign employees as Fire Wardens and First Aiders, • Ensure all staff on site are familiar with emergency evacuation procedures and the EMP content as it affects the facility/site, • Participate as required in periodic emergency exercise scenarios planning and delivery.
Plant and Equipment Manager	• Ensure all emergency response equipment for facilities and vehicles is in situ, functional and current (in conjunction with Property Manager).
Network Control Officer	• Collect the initial incident information and, if required, provide the appropriate protection from rail traffic at the site of the emergency as defined in the IMP, • Ensure adequate incident information is provided to the TCM and Head of Network Operations such that the appropriate response (Civil, Signal, Infrastructure, Incident Management Coordinator (IMC) and or Emergency Services) can be activated, • Maintain communications with the On-call representatives, • Manage safe network access to the site by Emergency Agencies, and • Continue to monitor and respond to directives from the EMT and ERT.

Position	Responsibilities
Incident Management Coordinator	• Fulfil the role of UGLRL IMC (commonly referred to as Rail Incident Commander for network incidents) when emergency services or combat agencies are involved and is responsible for establishing the UGLRL site response management team, liaison with NCO's, initiating site meetings and keeping records of those meetings, • For non-network incidents the IMC can be the respective supervisor, • Coordinate UGLRL 's activities at the site of the emergency and liaise between the UGLRL emergency response personnel at the site, the NMC/NCC (via the NCOs) and the Combat Agency Site Controller. • Arrange and co-ordinate site meetings between UGLRL emergency response representatives and attends and represents UGLRL at the incident site meetings arranged by the Combat Agency Site Controller.
Senior Legal Counsel	• Provide legal guidance, advice, clarity and determinations to the EMT and CEO as to UGLRL's legal position or potential exposure to litigation as may exist due to an emergency event.
Fire Wardens	• Implement the site-specific Evacuation Management Plan(s).

Appendix 2 Types and Classes of Emergencies

Type	Class	Description	Potential consequences	Likely magnitude and severity
Fire	Bushfire	• Uncontrolled bushfire adjacent to and threatening the rail corridor	• Network disruption on affected corridor • Damage to or loss of rail corridor boundary infrastructure • Injury or loss of life affecting the public	• Likely to affect only one corridor per event • May be a protracted impact on rail operations if Response Agencies require access across the corridor • Likely to be severe damage in Total Fire Ban periods • Injuries or loss of life likely to be minimal, but depends on location
	Fire in rail corridor	• Uncontrolled fire within the rail corridor boundary (for example, bushfire crosses corridor boundary, fire caused by defective rollingstock) • Uncontrolled fire in TfNSW asset • Uncontrolled fire in UGLRL infrastructure • Uncontrolled fire in third party asset (eg, intermodal depot or silo)	• Injury or loss of life affecting UGLRLf • Injury or loss of life affecting the public • Loss of TAHE assets • Loss of UGLRL assets • Loss of third party assets • Destruction of flora and fauna in rail corridor • Network disruption on affected corridor	• Likely to affect only one corridor per event • May be a protracted impact on rail operations if Response Agencies require access across the corridor • May be a protracted impact on network-wide operations if Operations Centre impacted • Likely to be severe damage in Total Fire Ban periods • Injuries or loss of life likely to be minimal, but depends on location • May be uncontrolled for extended period, depending on location
	Fire in rolling stock	• Uncontrolled fire in UGLRL or other RTO rolling stock	• Injury or loss of life affecting UGLRLf • Injury or loss of life affecting RSO staff • Loss of single or multiple items of rolling stock • Network disruption on affected corridor • Damage to CRN Infrastructure (TAHE assets)	• Likely to affect only one corridor per event • May impact rail assets over a wide area within a corridor if fire undetected in moving train • Unlikely to be extreme unless in stored or derelict rolling stock (and undetected for long period) • Fire in moving rolling stock likely to be detected by RTC or others (depending on location) • Damage to signaling equipment, timber sleepers and rail
	Fire in UGLRL building	• Uncontrolled fire in UGLRL facility or other building	• Injury or loss of life affecting UGLRLf • Loss of UGLRL assets • Loss of third party assets	• Likely to affect only one corridor per event • May be a protracted impact on rail operations if Response Agencies require access across the corridor • May be a protracted impact on network-wide operations if Operations Centre impacted (NMC/NCC)

Type	Class	Description	Potential consequences	Likely magnitude and severity
Explosion	In rolling stock (hazardous or other materials carried)	• Accidental explosion of hazardous materials within a stabled wagon • Accidental explosion of hazardous materials within a moving wagon • Accidental explosion of (road) fuel tanker while traversing the rail corridor (level crossing, underbridge, yard)	• Loss of single or multiple items of rollingstock • Loss of TAHE or UGLRL assets • Injury or loss of life affecting UGLRLf • Injury or loss of life affecting the public • Injury or loss of life affecting RTO staff • Network disruption on affected corridor	• Likely to affect only one corridor per event, but service disruption likely to be prolonged on that corridor • Injuries or loss of life likely to be minimal, but depends on location of explosion
	On infrastructure	• Accidental explosion of stored materials in depot or workshop or worksite	• Loss of TfNSW or UGLRL asset • Injury or loss of life affecting UGLRLf • Network disruption on affected corridor	• Likely to affect only one corridor per event • Injuries or loss of life to UGLRL staff likely to be minimal, but depends on location of explosion
Flooding	Inundation of rail corridor Inundation of TfNSW or UGLRL assets or buildings	• Natural flooding event due to rainfall or breach of riverbank or levee • Man-made event due to failure of water utility crossing infrastructure • Man-made event due to failure of water supply to building or fire sprinkler systems	• Loss of life or injury impacting UGLRLf • Loss of life or injury impacting the public • Network disruption due to rail corridor closure • Network-wide disruption due to loss of or damage to NMC/NCC • Loss of TAHE, UGLRL or third party assets	• Natural flooding event likely to affect only one rail corridor • Loss of life or injury to the public unlikely, but depends on location • Loss of life to UGLRL or third party staff unlikely • Loss of or damage to RSO, TfNSW or UGLRL assets likely, depending on the rapidity of the inundation • Complete loss of NMC/NCC unlikely, but damage to assets likely • Water utility crossing infrastructure failure unlikely to affect more than one location simultaneously
Earthquake	Minor, Major, Extreme	• Earthquake damages infrastructure and rail-based assets	• Loss of life or injury impacting UGLRLf • Loss of life or injury impacting the public • Network disruption due to rail corridor closure • Network-wide disruption due to loss of or damage to NMC/NCC • Loss of TAHE, UGLRL or third party assets	• Major or extreme earthquake unlikely on Eastern seaboard • Minor or medium earthquake likely to occur during period of the Contract • Tunnels likely to be structurally damaged except in minor earthquake events • Loss of track structure integrity likely with any significant lateral or vertical displacement of landmass • Unlikely to impact more than one corridor simultaneously, but depends on epicenter location • Subsequent damage of rail assets due to gas explosion or fire likely if gas utility supply crossing infrastructure damaged in significant displacement of landmass

Type	Class	Description	Potential consequences	Likely magnitude and severity
Collision	High speed passenger train-to-other train collision High speed passenger train-to-object collision High speed passenger or freight train-to- person collision High speed freight train-to-other train collision High speed freight train-to-object collision	• Collision involving high speed trains at junction or any other point on key passenger or freight corridor • Collision with obstruction/object involving high speed train at any point on key passenger or freight corridor • Collision with person at any point on the key passenger or freight network	• Loss of life impacting passengers and/or the public • Loss of life of RTC and/or public • Loss of RSO and TAHE assets • Loss of or damage to RIM infrastructure • Corridor disruption for extended period • Road closure if collision at level crossing	• If such event occurs involving a bus and a passenger train, magnitude of loss of life is considerable • If a (road) fuel tanker is involved (irrespective of train type or speed), likely magnitude of asset loss and loss of life is considerable • Magnitude of asset loss (rail infrastructure) is considerable in any high speed collision • Multiple corridors may be affected if train-to-train collision occurs at major rail junction • Loss of life of person illegally in the path of a train (irrespective of line speed) is highly likely
Derailment	Passenger train derailment or other event in restricted access location	• Passenger train derailment or collision or failure in tunnel • Passenger train derailment or collision or failure on bridge • Any train disablement in any restricted access location	• Egress of passengers not controlled or not done as per required process resulting in subsequent injury or death • Structural failure of bridge or collapse of tunnel due to any collision damage caused by collision event • Disabled train not adequately protected or notified to NCO, resulting in subsequent incident	• RSO to ensure all passengers are properly evacuated • Network Control to be notified immediately any train becomes disabled or experiences slow running
Terrorist act	Explosion	• Planned terrorist act designed to cause maximum loss of life and asset damage	• Consequences wholly dependent on chosen location or asset, but intended consequences would be loss of life and disruption to public • Loss of life of UGLRL staff possible • Loss of RTO, TAHE or UGLRL assets likely	• Magnitude of attack (if successful) would be considerable, but is location and asset dependent
	Sabotage of rollingstock, plant or mobile equipment	• Deliberate interference with rolling stock, plant or mobile equipment	• Injury or loss of life of UGLRL or RSO staff • Loss of RTO or UGLRL assets • Corridor or service disruption	• Magnitude of consequences dependent on extent of interference, and the equipment affected • Loss of life and asset damage or loss likely if both primary and redundant equipment or rolling stock safety systems compromised
	Sabotage of rail safeworking equipment or rail infrastructure	• Deliberate interference with safeworking equipment resulting in wrong-side failure	• Injury or loss of life of UGLRL or RSO staff • Loss of RTO, TAHE or UGLRL assets • Corridor or service disruption	• Magnitude of consequences dependent on extent of interference, and the equipment affected • Loss of life and asset damage or loss likely if both primary and redundant equipment or infrastructure safety systems compromised

Type	Class	Description	Potential consequences	Likely magnitude and severity
	Hijack of train service	• Deliberate interference with or unauthorised takeover of control of a moving train	• Injury or loss of life of UGLRL staff • Injury or loss of life of RTO staff • Loss of RTO or UGLRL assets • Corridor or service disruption	• Magnitude of loss wholly dependent on circumstances • Service disruption on corridor likely to be severe if hijacking event is prolonged or malicious
Network Control loss	Loss of Network Control Centre Simultaneous loss of backup facilities or capacity Loss of automatic signalling capacity	• Loss of system communication between NMC/NCC and all rail traffic • Loss of communication between NMC/NCC and specific rail traffic • Loss of communications between NMC and NCC (post remote working commissioning)	• Network-wide service disruption • Corridor-specific service disruption • Failure to maintain train separations due to loss of signalling or other safeworking protection	• Loss of life unlikely purely due to lack of train control oversight • Extensive service disruptions across all corridors once loss of network control identified
Medical event	Individual injury, illness or death in rail corridor	• Serious injury, illness or death to passenger • Serious injury, illness or death to UGLRL staff • Serious injury, illness or death to RTO staff • Serious injury, illness or death to visitor/public while on the rail corridor	• Loss of individual life • Disablement of Driver Only Operation (DOO) RSO train service (Explorer or XPT services)	• Loss of individual life • Extensive service disruption on specific rail corridor, depending on location of event
	Pandemic illness	• Widespread and uncontained pandemic illness affecting staff and the general population	• Extensive loss of operational staff capacity for UGLRL • Extensive loss of operational capacity for RSOs • Loss of life • Loss of network control capacity	• Extensive network disruption for prolonged period unlikely • Localised corridor service disruption likely
	Dangerous/noxious gas leak	• Localised severe effects to staff, passengers and the public from gas leak or other noxious substance	• Illness and loss of life to UGLRL staff • Illness and loss of life to passengers/MoP	• Extensive network disruption for prolonged period unlikely • Localised corridor service disruption likely • Widespread deaths unlikely, but is dependent on the type of noxious gas and location

Appendix 3 Risks and Mitigations

Type – class of emergency	Risk to safety	Mitigation strategy for the safety risks of the emergency
Fire – Bushfire	• Wind velocity changes • Secondary ignition points • Spotting • Flare-ups of hot spots • Latent radiant heat • Inability to egress site if conditions deteriorate	• All potential access/egress routes through the rail corridor are identified during consultation with Response Agencies, specifically with firefighting agencies • No UGLRL staff will act in a combat role • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site
Fire – Fire in rail corridor	• Ignition of unknown or unprotected fuel sources • Latent radiant heat • Inability to egress site if conditions deteriorate • Response Agencies may assume corridor access available after rail services resumed	• All potential access/egress routes through the rail corridor are identified during consultation with Response Agencies, specifically with firefighting agencies • No UGLRL staff will act in a combat role unless escalation of fire cannot occur and is manageable through local response capacities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site
Fire – Fire in rolling stock	• Lack of separation of additional unknown fuel sources from ignition sources • Unable to isolate or separate items of rolling stock • Latent radiant heat • Response Agencies may assume corridor access available after rail services resumed	• RTOs are required to isolate affected rolling stock to the extent possible • No UGLRL staff will act in a combat role unless escalation of fire is impossible and it is manageable through local response capacities • Consultation with Response Agencies (and SIA obligations) requires Response Agencies, specifically the firefighting agencies, to seek and be made aware of train running information
Fire – Fire in UGLRL building	• Latent radiant heat • Inability to egress site if conditions deteriorate • Fire containment efforts may impart further damage to assets • Staff unable to egress facility safely	• No UGLRL staff will act in a combat role unless escalation of fire is impossible and it is manageable through local response capacities • Emergency egress routes and processes for buildings, offices or facilities contained in Evacuation Management Plans confirmed via drills and exercises
Explosion – In rolling stock (hazardous or other materials carried)	• Type of hazardous materials not identified leading to inappropriate Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) being worn • Behaviour of unexploded materials affected by ambient conditions • Adjacent rolling stock unable to be removed (additional risk sources) • Inability to egress site if conditions deteriorate	• SIA obligations require RSOs to notify UGLRL and authorities train consists carrying hazardous or flammable materials • RSOs required to utilise and deploy fit-for-purpose rolling stock for conveyance ofhazardous materials • RSOs required to undertake emergency drills with Response Agencies and UGLRL as part of the EMP
Explosion – In infrastructure	• Type of hazardous materials not identified leading to inappropriate PPE being worn • Behavior of unexploded materials affected	• MSDS data for all hazardous materials used by UGLRL to be supplied and logged • Storage and handling requirements to be complied with by UGLRL ILS or project staff

Type – class of emergency	Risk to safety	Mitigation strategy for the safety risks of the emergency
Flooding – Inundation of rail corridor	• Secondary flash flooding after initial event • Residual flood debris may be hazardous • Structural asset damage or track foundation subsidence may not be detected • Subterranean electrical or other assets may be affected	• Track inspections and additional ballasting to be performed over affected corridors • All affected infrastructure to be inspected, tested and re-certified as serviceable prior to resumption of services • UGLRL CRN standards for mitigation of risks of substandard track to be applied
Flooding – Inundation of TfNSW or UGLRL assets or buildings	• Structural damage to buildings or assets may be undetected or improperly isolated • Residual damage to electrical assets or systems may not be detected prior to reinstatement • Evacuation causes injury to staff	• Alternative emergency egress routes and processes for flooded buildings, offices or facilities confirmed via drills and exercises (such as, second floor evacuation if relevant) as described in Evacuation Management Plans • Stand-by Control Centre (Mayfield NMC if post-RMTC project commissioning) on readiness level for crossover if required
Earthquake – Minor	• Structural damage to buildings or assets may be undetected or improperly isolated • Residual damage to electrical assets or systems may not be detected prior to reinstatement • Track inspections do not identify gauge or geometry faults prior to resumption of services	• Emergency egress routes and processes for buildings, offices or facilities contained in CNIs and Evacuation Management Plans and confirmed viadrills and exercises • Track inspections and additional ballasting to be performed over affected corridors • All affected infrastructure to be inspected, tested and re-certified as serviceable prior to resumption of services
Earthquake – Major	• Structural damage to buildings or assets may be undetected or improperly isolated • Residual damage to electrical assets or systems may not be detected prior to reinstatement	• UGLRL to liaise with geotechnical authorities to assess and understand risk exposure level of earthquakes in CRN region • Emergency egress routes and processes for buildings, offices or facilities contained in CNIs and Evacuation Management Plans and confirmed viadrills and exercises • Track inspections and additional ballasting to be performed over affected corridors • All affected infrastructure to be inspected, tested and re-certified as serviceable prior to resumption of services
Earthquake – Extreme	• Structural damage to buildings or assets remote from identified damage zone may be undetected or improperly isolated	• Emergency egress routes and processes for buildings, offices or facilities contained in CNIs and Evacuation Management Plans and confirmed viadrills and exercises • Track inspections and additional ballasting to be performed over affected corridors • All affected infrastructure to be inspected, tested and re-certified as serviceable prior to resumption of services
Collision – High speed passenger train-to-other train collision	• Approaching rail services are not diverted or stopped prior to corridor accessed by response agencies • Fire ignition sources not identified in rolling stock (such as, hot water heaters, buffet gas supply) resulting in secondary fire threat • Bystanders at risk from recovery operations (location dependent) • High NCO workload in recovering services results in secondary incident • Emergency access points to damaged rolling stock not known or noted (such as, emergency windows or doors)	• Fail-safe Train Control Systems employed • Passenger carrying RSOs to ensure all DOO rail traffic crews (RTCs) are fit to perform their duties (including fatigue management aspects)

Type – class of emergency	Risk to safety	Mitigation strategy for the safety risks of the emergency

Type – class of emergency	Risk to safety	Mitigation strategy for the safety risks of the emergency
Collision – High speed passenger train-to-object collision	• Approaching rail services are not diverted or stopped prior to corridor accessed by response agencies • Bystanders at risk from recovery operations (location dependent) • Road congestion due to level crossing closure not managed • High NCO workload in recovering services results in secondary incident	• Fail-safe Train Control Systems employed • RTCs are fit to perform their duties (including fatigue management aspects)
Collision – High speed passenger or freight train-to-person collision	• Approaching rail services are not diverted or stopped prior to corridor accessed by response agencies • High NCO workload in recovering services results in secondary incident	• RTO RTC's required to maintain the required level of vigilance when approaching stations, level crossings or known access points • TCM to monitor workload
Collision – High speed freight train-to-other train collision	• Approaching rail services are not diverted or stopped prior to corridor accessed by response agencies • Fire ignition sources not identified resulting in secondary fire threat • Bystanders at risk from recovery operations (location dependent) • High NCO workload in recovering services results in secondary incident	• Fail-safe Train Control Systems employed • RTOs to ensure all RTCs are fit to perform their duties (including fatigue management aspects)
Collision – High speed freight train-to-object collision	• Approaching rail services are not diverted or stopped prior to corridor accessed by response agencies • Bystanders at risk from recovery operations (location dependent) • Road congestion due to level crossing closure not managed • High NCO workload in recovering services results in secondary incident	• RSO RTCs required to maintain the required level of vigilance when approaching stations, level crossings or known access points
Derailment – Passenger train derailment or other event in restricted access location	• Approaching rail services are not diverted or stopped prior to corridor accessed by response agencies • Fire ignition sources not identified in rolling stock (such as, hot water heaters, buffet gas supply) resulting in secondary fire threat	• All potential access/egress routes through the rail corridor are identified during consultation with Response Agencies, specifically with firefighting agencies • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site • All affected infrastructure to be inspected, tested and re-certified as serviceable prior to resumption of services
Terrorist act – Explosion	• Dispersed site secondary explosions target assembly areas or other parts of the network simultaneously • Rail services not suspended across network before secondary explosions affecting network occur	• Security Management Plan preparedness exercises to be conducted • NCO to be made aware of the specific nature of any terrorist explosion/attack orthreat to deploy multiple attack site strategy • Emergency egress routes and processes for buildings, offices or facilities contained in CNIs and Evacuation Management Plans and confirmed viadrills and exercises
Terrorist act – Sabotage of rolling stock, plant or mobile equipment	• Extent of sabotage of other rolling stock, plant or mobile equipment not known or assessed • Affected assets not properly isolated or repaired	• Security Management Plan preparedness exercises to be conducted • NCO to be made aware of the specific nature of any sabotage/attack or threat todeploy multiple attack site strategy • All affected equipment to be inspected and recertified fit-for-purpose prior to re-entering service

Terrorist act – Sabotage of rail safeworking equipment or rail infrastructure	• Unable to detect if event is isolated or part of an extended pattern of interference • Rail services not advised of extent of interference and not halted as required	• Security Management Plan preparedness exercises to be conducted • NCO to be made aware of the specific nature of any sabotage/attack or threat todeploy multiple attack site strategy • All affected equipment to be inspected and recertified fit-for-purpose prior to re-entering service
Terrorist act – Hijack of train service	• Copycat attempts not predicted or properly mitigated • Media coverage not managed resulting in copycat attempts or biased publicity	• RTOs to ensure cab security strategies are in place and observed
Network Control Loss – Loss of Network Control Centre	• Back-up Operations Centre (NMC Mayfield, Post-RMTC commissioning) not maintained in ready-to-activate status • Trains in section not contacted or monitored by stand-by Centre or backup systems resulting in proceed authorities not observed	• Transfer network operations to NMC if required • Emergency egress routes and processes for buildings, offices or facilities contained in CNIs and Evacuation Management Plans and confirmed viadrills and exercises
Network Control Loss – Simultaneous loss of backup facilities or capacity	• Trains in section not contacted or monitored by mobile phone resulting in wrong-side proceed authority violations	• RSO internal emergency management contacts notified and redundant communication paths activated with trains in section
Network Control Loss – Loss of automatic signalling capacity (RVDS areas)	• Trains in section not contacted or monitored by NCC or NMC resulting in proceed authorities not observed	• RTO internal emergency management contacts notified and redundant communication paths activated with trains in section
Medical event – Individual injury, illness or death in rail corridor	• Mechanism or agency causing the illness, injury or death not isolated or identified • Halting of train in section and evacuation of the patient exposes Response Agencies to risk of adjacent running line risks (if in dual track territory)	• If patient is onboarding a train, the train is required to proceed to next available station and remain until Response Agencies arrive • If patient is in the rail corridor, all approaching trains to be notified to the extent possible and stopped short of the site to allow Response Agencies access
Medical event – Pandemic illness	• Appropriate PPE not provided to combat agencies or UGLRL or RSO operational staff • Breach of threshold of rail safety critical worker availability for safe running of network	• RSOs to Employ Business Continuity Plan UGLRL to employ BCMP (depending on severity and issuing of Government health advisories)
Medical event – Dangerous or noxious gas leak	• Appropriate PPE not provided to combat agencies or UGLRL or RSO operational staff • Mechanism or agency causing the illness, injury or death not isolated or identified • Affected assets not properly isolated or repaired	• Safety Data Sheets for all hazardous materials used by UGLRL to be supplied and logged • Storage and handling requirements to be complied with by UGLRL ILS or project staff • SIA obligations require RSOs to notify UGLRL and authorities of consists carrying hazardous or flammable materials • RSOs required to utilise and deploy fit-for-purpose rolling stock for conveyance ofhazardous materials • RSOs required to undertake emergency drills with Response Agencies and UGLRL • Emergency egress routes and processes for buildings, offices or facilities contained in CNIs and Evacuation Management Plans and confirmed viadrills and exercises

Appendix 4 Recovery Procedures

Type – Class of emergency	Rail operations restoration	Assistance to be provided to affected persons
Fire – Bushfire	• Rail corridor boundary inspections to be undertaken • Corridor infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained, assistance with relocation of accommodation. • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation
Fire – Fire in rail corridor	• Track inspections to be undertaken • Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services • Utility services in the rail corridor to be inspected and certified safe • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Site to be confirmed as released by Police or Fire authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained, assistance with relocation of accommodation. • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Fire – Fire in rolling stock	• Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services • All items of rolling stock affected to be isolated from the main line such that rail services maybe resumed • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Site to be confirmed as released by Police or Fire authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RTO RTC's and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained. • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided byUGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Type – Class of emergency	Rail operations restoration	Assistance to be provided to affected persons

Type – Class of emergency	Rail operations restoration	Assistance to be provided to affected persons
Fire – Fire in UGLRL building	• No specific procedures unless the building condition affects the safe running of trains • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Site to be confirmed as released by Police or Fire authorities	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained. • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Explosion – In rolling stock (hazardousor other materials carried)	• Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services • All items of rolling stock affected to be isolated from the main line such that rail services maybe resumed • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Site to be confirmed as released by Police or Fire authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided byUGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Explosion – In infrastructure	• Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services • All items of rolling stock affected to be isolated from the main line such that rail services maybe resumed • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Site to be confirmed as released by Police or Fire authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed

Type – Class of emergency	Rail operations restoration	Assistance to be provided to affected persons
Flooding – Inundation of rail corridor	• Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services • All items of rolling stock affected to be isolated from the main line such that rail services maybe resumed • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with thepriority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL P/L: Redeployment to other duties if place of work is affected for extended period (such as, depot), provision of financial and counselling services to affected staff consistent with the circumstances • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation
Flooding – Inundation of CRC or UGLRL assets or buildings	• No specific procedures unless the building or asset condition affects the safe running of trains • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Site to be confirmed as released by Fire and utility service authorities	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Earthquake – Minor	• No specific procedures unless the infrastructure, building or asset condition affects the safe running of trains • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services (if any interruption was required)	• Not applicable
Earthquake – Major	• Track inspections to be undertaken • Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services • Utility services in the rail corridor to be inspected and certified safe • Site to be confirmed as released by Police or Fire authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained, assistance with relocation of accommodation • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided byUGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed

| Earthquake – Extreme | • Track inspections to be undertaken
• Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced
• Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services
• Utility services in the rail corridor to be inspected and certified safe
• Site to be confirmed as released by Police or Fire authorities
• All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running
• RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded
• NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor | • UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained, assistance with relocation of accommodation
• Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided byUGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation
• Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party.   All required assistance will be provided as needed |
| Collision – High speed passenger train-to-other train collision | • Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities
• Damaged rolling stock to be inspected by any and all authorities conducting an investigation
• All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site
• Injured and deceased persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities
• Damaged rolling stock to be removed from the rail corridor
• Collision site restored and recovered to extent possible
• All affected rail infrastructure and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored
• Utility services in the rail corridor to be inspected and certified safe
• Affected systems to be tested and recertified as functional to the required engineering and technical standards
• All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running
• RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded
• NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor | • UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained
• Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation
• Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party.   All required assistance will be provided as needed |

| Type – Class of emergency | Rail operations restoration | Assistance to be provided to affected persons |

Collision – High speed passenger train-to-object collision	- Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities - Damaged rolling stock to be inspected by any and all authorities conducting an investigation - All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site - Injured and deceased persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities - Damaged rolling stock to be removed from the rail corridor - Collision site restored and recovered to extent possible - All affected rail infrastructure and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored - All affected road (level crossing) protection equipment and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored - Utility services in the rail corridor to be inspected and certified safe - Affected systems to be tested and recertified as functional to the required engineering and technical standards - All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running - RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded - NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	- UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained - Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation - Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Collision – High speed passenger or freight train-to-person collision	- Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities - Lead locomotive to be inspected by any and all authorities conducting an investigation - All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site - Injured and deceased persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities - Collision site restored and recovered to extent possible - All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running - RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded - NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	- UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained - Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation - Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Type – Class of emergency	**Rail operations restoration**	**Assistance to be provided to affected persons**

Collision – High speed freight train-to-other train collision	• Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities • Damaged rolling stock to be inspected by any and all authorities conducting an investigation • All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site • Injured and deceased persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities • Damaged rolling stock to be removed from the rail corridor • Collision site restored and recovered to extent possible • All affected rail infrastructure and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored • Utility services in the rail corridor to be inspected and certified safe • Affected systems to be tested and recertified as functional to the required engineering and technical standards • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries,personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Collision – High speed freight train-to-object collision	• Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities • Damaged rolling stock to be inspected by any and all authorities conducting an investigation • All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site • Injured and deceased persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities • Damaged rolling stock to be removed from the rail corridor • Collision site restored and recovered to extent possible • All affected rail infrastructure and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored • All affected road (level crossing) protection equipment and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored • Utility services in the rail corridor to be inspected and certified safe • Affected systems to be tested and recertified as functional to the required engineering and technical standards • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counseling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed

Type – Class of emergency	Rail operations restoration	Assistance to be provided to affected persons

Type – Class of emergency	Rail operations restoration	Assistance to be provided to affected persons
Derailment – Passenger train derailment or other event in restricted access location	- Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities or UGLRL and RTO as applicable - Damaged rolling stock to be inspected by any and all authorities conducting an investigation - All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site - Injured (or deceased) persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities - Damaged rolling stock to be recovered from the derailment site and stored pending further inspection and investigations - Derailment site restored and recovered to extent possible - All affected rail infrastructure and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored - All affected civil infrastructure and systems to be repaired, replaced or otherwise restored - Affected systems to be tested and recertified as functional to the required engineering and technical standards - All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running - RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded - NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	- UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counseling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained - Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation - Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Terrorist act – Explosion	- Initiate BCMP at UGLRL executive management level - Police or security agency to confirm terrorist threat is abated - Track infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced - Track sectors to be re-certified as fit for resumption of services - All items of rolling stock affected to be isolated from the main line such that rail services may be resumed - Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved - Crime scene to be confirmed as released by Police or other authorities - All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running - RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded - NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	- UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counseling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained - Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation - Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed

Terrorist act – Sabotage of rolling stock, plant or mobile equipment	• Initiate BCMP at UGLRL executive management level • Police or security agency to confirm terrorist threat is abated • Rolling stock, plant or mobile equipment not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • All items of rolling stock affected to be isolated from the main line such that rail services maybe resumed • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Crime scene to be confirmed as released by Police or other authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counseling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Terrorist act – Sabotage of rail safeworking equipment or rail infrastructure	• Initiate BCMP at UGLRL executive management level • Police to confirm terrorist threat or criminal activity is abated • Rail equipment or infrastructure not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Crime scene to be confirmed as released by Police or other authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counseling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained
Terrorist act – Hijack of train service	• Police or security agency to confirm criminal activity or terrorist threat is abated • Rolling stock not fit for service to be identified and repaired or replaced • All items of rolling stock affected to be isolated from the main line such that rail services may be resumed • Any evidence collected for forensic, criminal, rail safety or WorkCover investigations confirmed to be quarantined and preserved • Crime scene to be confirmed as released by Police or other authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: Medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the Third Party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
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Network Control Loss – Loss of Network Control Centre	• Initiate BCMP at UGLRL executive management level • Head of Network Operations to confirm to authorities that transfer of network control functionality and capacity has been established at alternate Control Centre (NMC, post-RMTC commissioning) • Head of Network Operations to confirm contractor Train Control staff are available at alternate Control Centre (Mayfield NMC, post- RMTC commissioning) • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Network Control Loss – Simultaneous loss of back-up facilities or capacity	• Initiate BCMP at UGLRL executive management level • Trains in section contacted or monitored by mobile phone or other means to ensure safe shutdown until network control can be restored • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Network Control Loss – Loss of automatic signalling capacity	• Head of Network Operations to initiate suitable replacement system of train management to ensure safe separation distances until automatic signalling control is restored • Trains in section contacted or monitored by mobile phone or other means to ensure safe shutdown until network control can be restored • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed

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Medical event – Individual injury, illness or death in rail corridor	• UGLRL to confirm the mechanism or agency causing the illness, injury or death has been isolated or identified • Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities • All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site • Injured and deceased persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed
Medical event – Dangerous or noxious gas leak	• Appropriate PPE provided to combat agencies and UGLRL or RSO operational staff if required • Mechanism or agency causing the illness, injury or death isolated and identified • Site to be declared safe by emergency authorities • All evidence required to be confirmed as collected, quarantined and removed from the site • Injured and deceased persons to be appropriately managed by Ambulance and Coronial authorities • All rail services terminated at appropriate station, yard or loop remote from the affected site to be inspected by RSO RTCs and confirmed as able to resume running • RSO RTCs to be relieved if shift length exceeded • NCO to initiate resumption of services on affected corridor(s) consistent with the priority of the affected services and the availability of train paths for the corridor	• UGLRL staff: medical treatment consistent with any injuries, personal counselling services consistent with any level of trauma sustained • Public: Assistance and resources required to be provided by UGLRL consistent with any public liability insurance obligation • Third party personnel: Consultation between UGLRL and third party to resolve liability issues and the funding of assistance for affected staff of the third party. All required assistance will be provided as needed